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1 Introduction 
It is broadly admited that economic growth results less from entrepreneurship measured by a global entry 
rate than from innovative entrepreneurship (Stam, 2013). Recognizing the role young and innovative companies 
play in the growth process is not straightforward. Various studies have reported the common problems faced by 
new high-tech firms in obtaining bank credit (Guiso 1998, Scelato 2007). The lack of interest shown by banks in 
financing  new enterprises obliges  governments and  policy  makers to  promote the  development  of alternative 
means of financing. Among the available alternative sources, private equity investors seem the most suitable in 
meeting the financial  needs  of  young and innovative companies (OECD,  2015). Indeed, these investors are 
geared towards long-hold,  multiple-year investment strategies in iliquid assets (whole companies, large-scale 
real estate  projects,  or  other tangibles  not easily converted to cash), where they  may control and influence 
operations or asset management to influence their long-term returns. 
Among the  diferent  players in this field,  venture capitalists are by far the  ones which have raised the 
greatest interest in the academic world (Rosenbusch et al. 2013). However, VCs cannot cover al the financial 
requirements necessary to  nurture expansion,  new-product  development or the restructuring  of a company’s 
operations, management, or ownership. In addition, venture capital firms are, for the most part, focused on later 
stage start-ups and, therefore, have left a significant funding  gap at the seed and early stage. The remaining 
funding gap faced by nascent entrepreneurs involved in the conception or the early stages of business creation 
has thus stil to be bridged. Angel investors intervene on this segment and form groups and syndicates to pool 
funds to fil this gap (OECD, 2011).  
This paper focuses on these not so new, but stil largely unknown, players of the financing system. Very 
few studies show their crucial role as providers of financial resources (Mason and Harison 1995) and mentors 
(Politis 2008) in accompanying young and innovative companies. A huge majority of these papers analyze the 
success of BA intervention from the point of view of the BA. Many are qualitative and are based on interviews 
(Macht et Robinson, 2009). Others estimate the added value of the BA's presence considering the diference in 
IPO  values (Chahine et al.  2007) and the level  of the internal rate  of return  observed in  BA  organizations 
(Heukamp et al. 2007; Mason and Harison 2002; Capizzi 2015). These studies, however, leave unresolved the 
measurement of the net advantage for the firms they back compared to those which are not. Our research seeks 
to provide some evidence in this field by proposing an empirical analysis of the performance observed in BA-
backed companies versus that measured in non-supported ones.  
This  paper takes a fresh look at the  question  of  whether entrepreneurial financiers afect the  growth  of 
companies in which they invest. In order to assess the advantage of being accompanied by a BA, we consider the 
company  perspective. Studying the impact  of the  participation  of a  BA in a company’s equity on company 
performance is a rather innovative approach, uncommon in the existing literature, in so far as we consider three 
ratios to  depict company  performance (the changes in the  number  of employees, in sales and in the tangible 
capital assets). To cary out this study, and this is the second novelty of the paper, we propose to investigate the 
diferences between BA-backed companies and two control groups. This analysis is possible thanks to the use of 
a unique data set containing 300 companies backed by institutional French BAs over the 2004-2007 period. We 
also have financial information available for these companies taken from the balance sheets and the profit and 
loss statements for 2008 and 2009. 
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 From this initial  population, and this is a third  originality  of the  paper,  we created two control  groups 
composed of an exhaustive dataset of companies whose annual financial statements are made available by the 
French Tax  Administration and the  National Institute  of  Statistics (INSEE).  One group  has  been randomly 
selected  whereas the  other is  made up of  nearest  neighbors, i.e. similar firms in terms  of size, age, industry, 
location and capital structure. This double comparison process alows us to purge our analysis of structural efect 
and to provide evidence about the importance of the methodology in composing the sample. 
Our results show that while being funded by a BA is hardly neutral, the efect obtained is not necessarily 
favorable.  The  diferences in the  performance  observed in the test  group significantly vary depending  on the 
control group considered. The set of BA-backed companies is more likely to exhibit superior performance when 
compared to a random sample whereas the performance of these companies is, at best, identical when compared 
to a sample composed  of  k–nearest  neighbors. When  one controls for the  profile  of the companies,  our result 
show that angels does not significantly permit to improve performance.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as folows. Section 2 presents the literature on the influence of 
BAs on company performance. Section 3 defines the main hypotheses tested in our study. Section 4 describes 
the  dataset and section  5 the econometric strategy adopted accordingly.  Section  6  depicts and comments the 
results of the empirical analyses.  We conclude considering the implications  of  our findings for  policy  makers 
and advisors in the business creation process. 
2 Survey of empirical literature on BAs contribution to performance  
The reputation  of  BAs as savvy investors can  be  partly atributed to comparative studies  which aim to 
demonstrate their ability to reduce risk or to improve the return that is expected or earned by themselves or other 
investors, such as VCs, in  particular.  The literature  mainly consists  of surveys caried  out  by sending 
questionnaires to  non-randomly selected entrepreneurs and/or  business angels rather than  of studies  based  on 
exhaustive or representative analysis. This quite contradictory situation is visible when looking at the literature 
on  BAs.  Two types  of  papers are available: the first type is  devoted to the  qualitative  outcome for the  whole 
entrepreneurial process, whereas the second seeks to measure the performance of BAs mainly from the investor 
point of view. 
2.1 BAs, more than financial investors 
Business angels (BAs) comprise a promising class of private investors who provide risk capital to new 
and  growing  businesses in  which they  have  no family connection (Mason and  Harison  1995,  2002).  They 
directly invest their  own  money, along  with their time and expertise, in unquoted companies in the  hope  of 
financial  gains (Mason  2007).  The  presence  of a  BA  on a  board is considered as an advantage for a start-up 
because it increases its  probability  of survival and facilitates the commitment  of  VCs and  other financial 
investors in the financing  of future investments.  BAs thus  play a crucial role  during the early stages  of a 
company's creation. However, their role is not limited to the accompanying of nascent companies. As a part of 
the “funding escalator” system (Gregson et al. 2013), they also determine their future and growth path.  
BAs' first singularity is  being investors  not  only concerned  with financing  but also  with the  whole 
entrepreneurial  process. Like  VCs, they  monitor, control and  help  with recruitment and additional fundraising 
(Helmann and  Puri  2002).  Due to their similar roles,  we can thus expect that  BAs  wil afect  business 
performance in much the same way as VCs: according to a survey performed on a sample of entrepreneurs, BAs' 
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strong involvement in a company’s life leads to an improvement in the company’s performance measured by the 
change in the number of employees or in sales growth (Davila et al. 2003).  
The first research is based on 14 previous qualitative studies and provides an analysis and an appreciation 
of the contribution  of  BAs to a company.  They  play  multiple roles: sounding  board, strategist, supervisor, 
monitor, resource acquisition enabler and  mentor (Politis  2008). The investor  provides strategic advice to the 
entrepreneur based on his or her extensive business know-how and management expertise. Their contribution is 
extended through a  variety  of  hands-on roles ranging from  board  membership to less structured consulting 
activities and formalized part-time assignments. The impact of this hands-on involvement on the performance of 
the business remains, however, unclear. 
In the second study, Macht and Robinson (2009) interviewed managers in 9 BA-backed companies about 
the advantages of such a financing scheme. Their contribution to the life of a business is both financial and non-
financial. They help overcome funding gaps, fil knowledge and experience gaps, provide contacts and leverage 
further funding. The quality of the relationship between the investor and the investee is a crucial condition for 
such advantages to occur.  The authors also show that  BAs,  who are  mainly  motivated  by the return  on their 
investment,  do  not  become actively involved to a  great extent and, consequently, are  no  diferent from  other 
money providers.  
If  BAs are  not involved, their contribution is considered as similar to that  of  VCs.  According to the 
literature, VCs exert influence on sales (Bertoni et al. 2013), on employee growth (Davila et al. 2003) and finaly 
for Puri and Zarutskie (2012), on both sales and employment. It is, however, dificult to admit that the efects of 
the  ownership structure  on the  diferent  performance ratios are strictly  proportional (Murphy,  Trailer and  Hil 
1996). For example, a growth in sales can be achieved at the cost of reduced firm profitability. Therefore, it is 
highly  unlikely that the  use  of a single  measure  of firm  performance could suficiently capture the efects  of 
business angels’ hands-on involvement.  
If BAs are involved, their impact on a firm’s performance cannot be strictly similar to those atributable 
to a  VC  because  BAs are  not  perfect copies  of  VCs.  As  non-professional investors,  BAs face  dificulties in 
gaining access to financial information (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Consequently, they tend to invest close to 
home, typicaly within a day's drive (Freear et al. 2002 ; Berchicci et al. 2011) and their dealings of sourcing and 
investing remain a face-to-face exercise (Sohl 2006). Being more likely to invest on « gut feeling » (Mason and 
Harison, 2002, p. 220), BAs are also less investment-eficient. 
Despite the insights on BAs' motivation and behavior provided by these studies, the literature on BAs stil 
omits some important points. That is why, as recommended by Politis (2008), future research on business angels 
and their added  value should include a  wide range  of theoreticaly relevant  performance criteria  when 
empiricaly testing for the efect of business angels’ hands-on involvement on the performance of a business. 
2.2 The superior capability of BAs as investors, a disputed question 
Contrary to previous research, which considers how BAs add value to companies, the papers surveyed in 
this section deal with performance. Some investigate investor return on investment; others focus on performance 
when the backed company has access to the equity market. There is only one which takes the investor's point of 
view. The results obtained are, however, quite ambiguous. 
A first set  of  papers approximates  performance  by measuring the Internal  Rate  of  Return (IRR) 
(Capizzi  2015 ;  Heukamp et al.  2007 ;  Mason and  Harison  2002). Based  on diferent  methodologies and 
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samples, they  obtain  diferent results. Capizzi (2015) analyses the  determinants  of IRR  using a  dataset 
containing the details of 119 disinvestments3 caried out in Italy during the 2007–2011 period. The results of the 
econometric estimation lead him to conclude that experience measured by the number of investments made by a 
BA maters in determining IRR but, like in Capizzi (2011), this efect vanishes beyond a threshold. The selection 
process also maters since the returns earned by investors who are more selective with the projects they evaluate 
are higher than the returns earned by less selective ones. The third variable, which stil has a positive but less 
significant efect, is the length  of the financial relationship. Indeed, investors  who  maintain their financial 
resources in the investee company for  more than  3  years are  more likely to earn  higher returns than investors 
who hold their investment for less than 3 years.  
The capacity  of experienced  BAs to  perform  beter is largely caled into  question  by  Heukamp et al. 
(2007),  who adopt a radicaly  diferent  methodology.  To assess the added  value  provided  by  BAs, they 
conducted a survey on 59 VCs located in German-speaking countries. A section of the questionnaire concerns 
the point of view of the VC on the influence that a BA may exert on the IRR of the companies in which they 
invest.  A large  majority  of respondents consider that  when they compare them to solo investments, co-
investments  with  BAs  do  not  generate  higher returns.  The explanation  of this  negative  perception  of the  BAs' 
capacity to improve the return  of an investment lies in their specific appreciation  of risk and the resulting 
behavior as investors.  This is shown  by  Mason and  Harison (2002).  They compare the return  profile  of  127 
mail-surveyed  BAs to the results  of  Muray (1999),  who analyses the risk  profile  of three  UK early-stage 
specialist  venture capital funds.  They conclude that  business angels’  portfolios  present a lower share  of 
investments in which they lose money, and a significantly higher proportion of investments generating modest 
returns compared to those held by VCs.  
A second set of papers assesses the performance of entrepreneurial IPOs. Chahine et al. (2007) measure 
the performance as the IPO initial pricing related to BA retained ownership, whereas Johnson and Sohl (2006) 
observe the diferences between the ranking of underwriters of firms that are angel-backed and that exhibited by 
those which are not. Both show that BA-backed companies have a lower score except in the French case where 
there is no significant diference (Chahine and al. 2007). They mainly explain this underperformance by the poor 
capacity of BAs to generate a strong reputation for taking high quality firms public. In the French case, the non-
significant efect diference could be due to the stronger commitment in “grandstanding” (Chahine and al. 2007 
p. 524). The main limit of these studies comes from the selection of a set of companies able to enter on financial 
markets.  The samples considered are thus  highly  biased toward the  very  best companies and, thus, cannot  be 
considered as representative of the population of companies benefiting from the mentoring and financial support 
of a BA. 
The beter performance of a BA-backed company is also considered by Ahmed and Cozzarin (2009) in an 
empirical study consisting in the estimation  of the influence  of financing structure  on the  performance  of  52 
companies  operating in the  biotechnology industry.  They  use two  performance indices, the rate  of change in 
sales and a ratio reporting the sales growth to the R&D capital over the 1999-2001 period. They conclude that 
sales growth merely depends on conventional (bank) capital and that angel capital has the second greatest impact 
 
3 The econometric  model is estimated  with  81 exits  because not-significant variables (with less than three data) have been 
excluded from the sample. 
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with venture capital third. But sales growth is the only performance dimension considered, and a wide range of 
performance criteria should be included as recommended for instance by Macht and Robinson (2009). 
Looking at the literature, it is obvious that the advantages of business angel activity are stil questionable 
and that a lot remains to be done to understand beter their influence on business performance.  
3 Hypotheses 
As emphasized in the  previous  Section, the literature  on  business angels considers that their  net 
contribution to economic life is twofold. They not only provide financial resources to the companies in which 
they invest, but they also take an active part in the monitoring and reorganization of the companies in which they 
participate (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). They mentor the entrepreneur, and open access to providers and potential 
customers thanks to their network (Macmilan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). These 
advantages  make it  possible to significantly improve the  performance  of angel-backed companies. This 
conclusion  mostly refers to studies  dealing  with  venture capital. Davila et al. (2003), and  Alemany and  Marti 
(2005) empiricaly show that VC-backed firms have significantly higher revenues and employment growth rates 
than nonVC-backed firms. Chemmanur et al. (2011) find that VC-backed firms have higher operating eficiency 
than nonVC-backed firms whereas Puri and Zarutskie (2012) report a performance gap between VC and nonVC 
financed firms.  
The theoretical argument  underlying this  positive appreciation lies in the agency costs,  which  has  been 
the  dominant concept in explaining the investor – entrepreneur relationship (Kely and  Hay, 2001;  van 
Osnabrugge,  2000).  The central  place  occupied  by the agency theory comes from its capacity to  provide  both 
predictions and prescriptions for explaining individual behavior when outside ownership is involved. In its two 
dimensions,  normative and positive, agency theory succeeds in explaining  why and  how equity investors  may 
reduce or even solve the agency problems traditionaly arising between an investor and an entrepreneur. It grants 
the congruence  between the  goals targeted  by the entrepreneurs and the investors through a  double  process 
happening ex-ante and ex-post. 
When an active investor enters into a company, he/she behaves like outside stakeholders who carefuly 
observe the firm to track its  business  potential and  monitor agent  behavior to protect against  opportunism. 
Information asymmetry  may thus lead to sub-optimal choices ex ante,  but a  VC typicaly conducts a  due 
diligence assessment  of the  venture and the entrepreneur (Tyebjee and  Bruno  1984), a  precautionary  measure 
which reduces the risk of adverse selection. Once the investment has been made, the active monitoring operated 
by the investor reduces the risk  of  moral  hazard.  We could expect these same arguments to apply to the  BA-
entrepreneur relationship.  As a consequence,  BA-backed companies should  perform  beter than  non-backed 
ones. 
The lack of empirical evidence on the superior return earned by VC-backed companies has raised some 
doubts about the  validity  of the agency theory applied to  VC-entrepreneur relationships.  As  mentioned  by 
Arthurs and  Busenitz (2003), two  main arguments support this theory in justifying the reduction  of ex-post 
agency  problems.  On  one  hand, after the investment  decision, the  VC is likely to change from  being a  wary 
investor to a wiling colaborator (Sapienza, 1992). On the other hand, even if the founding entrepreneur owns a 
reduced  percentage  of the equity,  he/she  may  wish to  maintain strong individual-specific investments in the 
venture. Conflicts may thus arise and give rise to ‘horizontal’ agency costs (Colombo et al. 2014), related to the 
fact that diferent principals have heterogeneous interests, preferences and objectives. Accordingly, there is no 
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reason to expect that companies having active investors on the board should exhibit diferent performance than 
other ones. 
At this stage, the same theory is of no help in deciding whether firms accompanied by an equity investor 
perform beter or not than those that are unaccompanied. There is, however, a third possibility induced by the 
application of the agency theory to the financing relationship.  
The relevance  of agency theory, rooted in the separation  between  ownership and control in large 
corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), in the financing of smal and early-stage companies has often been 
contested  because such companies are  often closely  held.  But,  despite this tight equity structure, information 
asymmetry remains a valid assumption when investors are non-professional. This is indeed the case with Angels 
who mainly come from the entrepreneurial world (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). This feature is a real drawback as 
it  prevents  BAs from accessing financial information,  understanding the strategic choices  of the founding 
entrepreneur and assessing the reliability of his or her expectations. BAs are thus led to compensate for their lack 
of  knowledge and skils by strengthening their requirements towards the entrepreneur. It takes time for the 
entrepreneur to comply to these increased requirements, to explain his/her choices and to justify himself/herself, 
precious time which could perhaps otherwise be devoted to managing the business and looking for new business 
opportunities.  Such coordination  problems are likely to  degrade the  performance  of the investee company so 
that, as mentioned by Capizzi (2015) and Van Osnabrugge (2000), firms having a BA on the board may exhibit 
lower performance than those without one. 
Consequently, this  paper analyses two related  questions: the existence  of superior economic impact  on 
BA-backed firms and its relationship with  BA funding.  To assess the contribution  of  Angels to a company's 
performance,  we consider several  diferent ratios, folowing the  point  of  view  of  practitioners according to 
whom growth is a complex phenomenon (Achtenhagen et al. 2010), not only reflected by sales or employment 
growth but one which also requires us to pay atention to internal development. Thus, folowing Murphy et al. 
(1996), who consider that sales and employment are both satisfying proxies of firm performance, we estimate to 
what extent being backed by an Angel may increase the performance of a company. We examine successively 
these two ratios, even if it has been shown that they can be corelated (Coad, 2009) to capture the diferent points 
of view on performance. To complete this external perspective, we introduce a third ratio, namely the growth of 
tangible capital assets, a factor which approximates the capacity of a firm to extend its market size. 
The first hypothesis to be tested is thus: 
H1: Angel-backed companies are more likely to present higher performance than non-backed ones. 
H1.a: they exhibit a higher rate of growth of employment, 
H1.b: they have a higher rate of growth of sales 
H1.c: they present a higher rate of growth of tangible capital assets. 
In addition to this first level diference, we also introduce a second hypothesis to capture the performance 
induced by the accompanying process implemented by a BA. It is expressed as: 
H2: Among the BA-backed companies, those with a long lasting financing relationship are likely to 
have greater performance than those with a short financial relationship. 
As in the  previous  hypothesis,  performance is approximated  by employment, sales and tangible capital 
assets rate of growth. 
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4 Dataset and descriptive statistics 
Previous comparative studies  generaly agree to consider that a  BA's involvement in the  definition and 
implementation  of the company’s strategy enables it to reach a  higher level  of  performance than  non-backed 
companies. This favorable appreciation mainly rests upon surveys or empirical analysis whose robustness is in 
doubt. There are two basic reasons for the lack of robustness of the results obtained in previous studies. First, the 
lack  of  data to identify the complete  population,  given that  BAs are  non-financial institutions and, thus,  not 
obliged to  provide  detailed information  of their investment  portfolios.  Second, the  dificulty  of accessing 
financial information  on  privately  held  BA-backed firms.  One reason is that  BAs are supposed to  keep this 
information secret and the  disclosure  of financial  data  might compromise a relationship resting  upon trust. 
Another reason comes from the smalness  of the  BA-backed companies  which are  not  obliged to file their 
financial statements  with the commercial court registries.  As  private  datasets are composed  of the information 
provided  by the commerce courts, they contain  neither the  balance sheet  nor the  profit and loss statement 
account of these very smal companies. 
We confront these criticisms by testing the previous hypotheses on the French case using a unique data 
set consisting in the merging of three diferent sources. France is worth studying empiricaly because the country 
has one  of the  most active business angel  markets in  Europe: in  2009, 81  networks/groups were active, 
positioning the country in second place behind the US (350) and before the UK (74) (OECD 2011)4. However, 
the impact  of these equity investors group  on firm  performance  has  been  barely tested, and the rare atempts 
proposed are based on a sample composed solely of IPO firms so that they yield biased results. 
4.1 Data sources 
Our dataset is build up from the merging of three data sets provided by the French National Institute of 
Statistics5 and one by the network France Angels. The first one, is named FARE (Fichier Approché de Résultats 
d’Entreprises). It contains the tax report, mainly composed of the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement 
of any taxable corporate company located in France, which is about 3 milion enterprises. The second source is 
the Register of Businesses and Establishments (REE or Répertoire des Entreprises et des Etablissements), which 
provides information  on the age  of the companies. The third one is the LiFi  dataset of firms'  ownership and 
foreign financial linkages. They are merged with a list of 300 companies backed by a business angel member of 
the  network  France  Angels6 over the  2003-2007  period. In addition to the i.d.  number  of the companies 
supported, this dataset provides information about the length of the relationship between the company and the 
BA.  
We are thus endowed with a sample of 300 enterprises funded by an angel member of the network France 
Angels for which we have also obtained the whole tax report. This sample represents 79% of the total number of 
companies funded by this network in 2009. This test group is compared to two reference groups extracted from 
the FARE dataset. The first one contains 1,799 similar companies, based on the number of employees, the age, 
the location7, the industry in which they operate8, and the capital structure. They have been selected using the k-
 
4 From the point of view of the total amount invested, France and UK are almost equivalent. Appendix 1 presents some key 
figures of the diferent European markets. 
5 We are  grateful to the Statistical  Confidentiality  Commitee (Comité  du  Secret  Statistique), the  French  body supervising 
access to data, for providing the data bases under strict confidentiality agreements. 
6 We thank the members of France Angels for their support to this project and their wilingness to share the data. 
7 We adopted the 2nd level of the Nomenclature of Units for Teritorial Statistics (NUTS). 
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nearest neighbours method introduced by Weiss and Kulikowski (1991)9. The second control group comprises 
1,830 companies randomly selected among a  population  465,744  of companies  having  100 employees  or less 
operating in the market sector excluding farm, financial, and rental industries. 
The comparison  with two reference  groups  makes it  possible to control the influence  of the selection 
process implemented by angels. As investors, they do not choose the project in which they invest at random. On 
the contrary, they prefer investing in industries in which they have previous experience, innovative projects with 
a low exposure to competition within an existing market, high or medium growth firms whose sales expectations 
are favorable and in ventures run by a talented team. Using a reference group composed of 6-nearest neighbors 
controls for the  bias resulting from the BA  preference system, while  puting some emphasis  on the risks  of a 
comparison  with a randomly selected reference  group (Ker et al. 2011). This  double comparison also  makes it 
possible to assess the extent to  which the structure  of the reference  group influences the evaluation  of the 
performance induced by Angels when they invest in a company. 
4.2 Measuring firm growth  
The  definition  of the  best index to  measure firm  growth  has long  been  disputed in the literature.  The 
debates are  motivated  by a twofold  problem.  Firstly, as a complex  phenomenon,  growth can  be  measured  by 
various criteria.  Secondly, the construction  of the index  may also influence the result  measured.  We  wil 
examine these two aspects successively. 
Sales and employment  measures are the  most  widely  used in empirical  growth studies (Delmar  1997). 
The indicator chosen depends on the field covered. Industrial economists refering to Gibrat’s law mainly use the 
employment growth rate (Coad, 2009), which is also easily accessible and applies to al types of firms. Scholars 
closer to business administration consider that turnover growth is a beter index since it is a key target for the 
entrepreneurs themselves and is simultaneously closely  observed  by shareholders and equity investors 
(Ardichvili et al. 1998). Petersen and Ahmad (2007) state that while gross added value or profits are a highly 
meaningful  growth  variable, appropriate  data for cross-nation  or even cross-industry evaluations are rarely 
available. On the other hand, indicators such as market share and physical output can be compared only within 
firms or industries with a similar product range (Delmar et al. 2003). Coad (2007) provides evidence about the 
strong corelation  between these indicators. In addition to these indicators,  Baumol (1962) states that capital 
assets, which can be expected to be closely related to turnover, are a leading indicator of firm growth and, for 
this reason, are a  highly  meaningful  growth  variable. In  order to capture  various aspects  of the firm  growth 
phenomenon, we use them concurently.  
The  hypotheses are thus tested  using three explained  variables: the  growth rate  of employment, the 
growth rate of sales and the growth rate of tangible capital assets. In order to circumvent the problems of bias 
towards smal companies raised by the use of relative ratios to measure firm growth,10we compute firm growth 
rate as a logarithmic diference, a common method in firm growth analysis (Coad 2009). 
VarEmpl = lnEmplt – lnEmplt-1 
 
8 To	 define	 the	 industries,	 we	 adopt	 the	 French	 Classification	 system	 which	 is	 strictly	 equivalent	 to	 the	 European	
standard	classification	of	productive	economic	activities	(NACE).	We	took	the	second	level,	which	consists	of	headings	
identified	by	a	two-digit	numerical	code	(divisions). 
9 This subset  has been composed thanks to a  SAS  « CAHQUAL »  procedure  made available  by the INSEE (1994).  For a 
more detailed presentation of the SAS procedure used to compose this reference group see Appendix 2. 
10 Smal initial size means that large relative growth is easier to achieve with quite smal absolute growth whereas large initial 
size demands for large absolute growth in order to reach high relative growth. 
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VarSales = lnSalest – lnSalest-1 
VarAss = lnAsst – lnAsst-1 
Where Empl stands for the number of employees, Sales for sales, and Ass for tangible capital assets. The 
index t-1 denotes for a lagged variable.  
These continuous variables risk causing a decrease in the number of observations to estimate the models. 
To minimize this risk, we also create categorical variables, named Var_Yt, which makes it possible to estimate 
multinomal logit models, as in the folowing examples: 
Cl_Var_Yt = 0 if Yi,t - Yi,t-1 <0 
Cl_Var_Yt = 1 if Yi,t - Yi,t-1 =0 
Cl_Var_Yt = 2 if Yi,t - Yi,t-1 >0 
where Y denotes alternatively Ef, the  number  of employees, CA, the turnover, and ImmC, the tangible 
capital assets. As previously, t-1 designates a lagged variable. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table  1 provides descriptive statistics for the  main explained and explanatory  variables. It appears that 
business angels invest in a large  variety  of industries, including those  with a low level  of innovation.  They, 
however, tend to be over-represented in the communication industries.  
Table 1 Sectoral structure of the three samples 
 Nearest neighbors sample BA sample Random sample 
Section Freq. Pourcentage Freq. Pourcentage Freq. Pourcentage 
Manufacturing 180 10.00 30 10.00 44 2.40 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 6 0.33 1 0.33 8 0.44 
Water colection, treatment and supply 12 0.67 2 0.67 10 0.55 
Construction 24 1.33 4 1.33 244 13.33 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles 204 11.33 34 11.33 490 26.78 
Transportation and storage 12 0.67 2 0.67 5 0.27 
Accommodation and food services  6 0.33 1 0.33 18 0.98 
Information and communication 774 43.00 129 43.00 220 12.02 
Professional, scientific and technical  414 23.00 69 23.00 485 26.50 
Administrative and support service activities  54 3.00 9 3.00 67 3.66 
Education 48 2.67 8 2.67 128 6.99 
Human health and social works activities  18 1.00 3 1.00 2 0.11 
Arts, entertainments and recreation  30 1.67 5 1.67 48 2.62 
Others service activities 18 1.00 3 1.00 61 3.33 
Total 1800 100.00 300 100.00 1830 100.00 
Sources: INSEE and France Angels; computations are ours. 
Figure  1 represents the  kernel  density estimation  of the three explained  variables  growth rate  of 
employment,  of sales and  of tangible assets) for the three  populations  under review.  The  distribution  of the 
diferent  growth rates displays a characteristic tent-shaped  probability  density and looks like the  Laplace 
distribution with fat tails.  Table  2  presents the  main characteristics  of the three  populations.  The corelation 
matrix is available in Appendix 2.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables according to the sample 
   Mean St. Dev. P10 P90 
Nearest neighbors sample    
Empl08 6.130 12.092 0.000 19.000 
Sales08 968.853 3271.479 0.001 2349.626 
Ass08 181.557 1499.382 0.001 259.935 
Var_Empl 0.021 0.447 -0.405 0.405 
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Var_Sales 0.649 3.716 -0.664 2.273 
Var_Ass 0.810 3.846 -0.227 7.648 
FinIndep 329.577 7066.103 0.000 0.552 
Sales_Ass 28934.434 367796.062 1.000 16853.000 
Age 5.732 3.735 2.000 11.000 
BA sample    
Empl08 7.530 11.461 0.000 19.000 
Sales08 699.456 2123.984 0.001 1566.244 
Ass08 154.708 1078.830 0.001 223.673 
Var_Empl 0.122 0.523 -0.405 0.693 
Var_Sales 0.518 4.328 -1.835 3.149 
Var_Ass 0.579 3.707 -0.404 3.565 
FinIndep 1758.696 16960.535 0.000 0.978 
Sales_Ass 3135.840 36117.071 0.139 57.235 
Age 5.713 4.096 2.000 10.000 
Random sample    
Empl08 2.336 7.144 0.000 5.000 
Sales08 454.971 2135.124 8.525 761.492 
Ass08 80.931 1036.408 0.001 89.066 
Var_Empl -0.031 0.430 -0.651 0.405 
Var_Sales -0.072 2.279 -0.611 0.772 
Var_Ass 1.404 4.285 -0.217 10.275 
FinIndep -43.349 9510.880 0.000 0.445 
Sales_Ass 31813.618 462663.788 1.529 29379.500 
Age 6.622 4.081 2.000 13.000 
Sources: Insee and France Angels, computations are ours. 
5 The empirical model 






where 푌푖,푡 represents alternatively the employment, the sales and the tangible capital assets growth rate computed 
at the firm level or the categorical variable. BA is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the company is backed by a 
business angel,  0  otherwise. Account is a  vector  of accounting ratios  whereas Tail represents the firm size 
defined either  by the turnover,  by the  number  of employees,  or the total  of tangible assets depending  on the 
explained  variable  used. Age is the age of the company computed as the diference between t  and the year  of 
foundation  of the company. S is a  dummy  variable  which represents the industry within  which the company 
operates푆푗, j={1,…, 5}.  
The second hypothesis is tested using equation (2) similar to the first one, with one major exception. It 
includes an additional  variable,  named length, to  measure the  duration  of the financial relationship  between a 










   
   
   
Fig. 1 Kernel density estimation of explanatory variables 
Notes: The Kernel density is computed using Epanenchnikov kernel. Y-axis is in log scale. 
The graph is estimated using the “kdensity package” available in STATA 12.1 software. 
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We have run the estimations using diferent techniques. This mix also enables us to test the robustness of 
our results. The  distribution  of the explained  variables rules  out any  possibility of  using standard regression 
estimators which are not robust to outliers and heavy-tailed distributions. In such a case, Coad and Rao (2008) 
and Coad and Hölzl (2012) highlight the superiority of simple QR to estimate a firm growth model. The authors 
mention three main advantages to this technique. Firstly, it alows for the keeping of high growth firms in the 
sample instead  of considering them as  outliers and  dropping them.  Since the corelation coeficients are 
estimated along the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, this prevents misleading results caused by 
the estimation of average efects of the explanatory variables, as ordinary OLS method does, when high growth 
firms are kept in the dataset. Secondly, QR estimator guarantees the robustness of the estimation results when 
erors are  not  normaly  distributed.  This is the case  here  because  growth rate  distribution folows a  Laplace 
distribution with fat tails (Figure 1). Thirdly, QR does not require eror terms to be identicaly distributed at al 
points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Eliminating this constraint enables us to estimate 
the efects  of the regressors at any  point along the  distribution  of  growth rate. In  order to  keep the  maximum 
observation in the estimation, we also estimate the model using level variables, a technique which enables us to 
keep in the samples companies  with  no employees,  which  would  otherwise  be excluded from the estimation 
since the continuous variable is computed as a logarithmic diference. We use a multinomial logistic regression 
to make the estimation because, as pointed out by Liao (1994), the logit model is more robust than the probit 
model in the presence of outliers.  
6 Results and discussion 
This Section presents the results of the estimations of the diferent models using two comparison levels. 
In the first  one, the  300  BA-backed companies,  BA sample  hereafter, are compared to a randomly selected 
sample, random sample below, whereas in the second one they are compared to a 6-nearest neighbors sample, 
neighbor sample  below, over the  2008-2009 period. Because  of the tent-shaped  distribution  of the explained 
variables, the  models are estimated  using a  quantile regression technique.  They  have also  been estimated  by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)11 and logistic estimation for comparison purposes.  
It is worth noting that whatever the estimation technique used, the results are convergent. Concerning the 
first hypothesis, there is a consistent finding that the advantages provided by angels to the investee companies 
are highly sensitive to the test group. Indeed, we find that BA-backed companies perform beter than non-backed 
ones only when they are compared to a randomly selected control group. On the contrary, when we compare the 
test group to a set composed of similar companies (nearest neighbors sample), the advantage mostly disappears. 
Using  quantile regression technique enriches the empirical analysis as it makes it  possible to  diferentiate the 
impact of BAs along the distribution of the value of the growth rate. This higher degree of precision is of high 
interest because gazeles are supposed to be the targeted group for BAs. 
Because of the convergence of the results obtained, we only interpret the results provided by the quantile 
regression estimation technique. Indeed, it  provides additional information, as it evaluates the corelations 
between a given regressor and the dependent variable along the diferent quantiles of its distribution. Figure 2 
presents the estimated coeficients of the presence of a BA on the board as a function of employment, turnover 
 
11 We report the OLS estimation results only for comparison purposes.  
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and tangible assets growth rate distribution. We only provide graphs for this variable of interest. Tables 7 to 13 
in Appendix 4 provide the detailed results. 
6.1 BA-backed companies do not perform beter than non-backed ones 
Our first  hypothesis is about the role  played  by  BAs in firm  performance. Figures  2a-2c  quantify the 
relationship between angel group financing and outcomes when the set of BA-backed companies is compared to 
a random one whereas figures 3a-3c compare the test group to the 6-neareast neighbors set. Looking at the value 
and the significance of the coeficients of the binary variable depicting whether a BA is on board of the company 
or not, it is clear that the control population maters in the results obtained. BAs' impact on performance is more 
significant,  mainly  on sales,  when the test  population is compared to a random sample than to the  nearest 
neighbors sample.  
Our estimations show that  BAs  positively contribute to employment  growth  on the right side  of the 
distribution. This confirms  only  partialy  our first  hypothesis (H1a). Indeed, the estimated coeficients  of the 
dummy variable (Rand_pop or Neigh_pop) are positive and significant from the 50th quantile of the conditional 
distribution  of the employment  growth whereas their efect is significantly  positive  between the  75th and  90th 
quantile only when the comparison is made against a set of nearest neighbors. However, their influence depends 
on the value of the growth rate; as shown by the positive slope of the curve between the 50th (resp. 75th) and the 
90th quantiles. This result enables us to consider that BAs demonstrate an entrepreneurial orientation (Lindsay 
2004), leading them to facilitate the growth process of the most successful companies. 
The  diference is even stronger  when  one considers the sales and tangible assets growth rate. Indeed, 
whereas a  positive efect is  observed  on the right side  of the  distribution  when  one compares  BA-backed 
companies to the random sample, the coeficients are no longer significant when the test group is compared to 
the nearest neighbors group. Hypothesis H1b is invalidated whereas H1c is only confirmed in the central part of 
the distribution which coresponds to a nul growth rate. 
Considering the superior robustness  of the comparison to a  group composed  of similar companies,  one 
may consider that  our results confirm  doubts regarding the capacity  of  BAs to raise the  performance  of the 
companies in  which they invest (Cowling et al.,  2008;  Carpentier and  Suret,  2013) and the findings from the 
most recent empirical literature on VCs (Alperovych et al., 2015).  
 
a. Employment growth rate  
 
806 observations 
b. Sales growth rate 
 
2,107 observations 
c. Tangible assets growth rate 
 
2,107 observations 
Fig. 2 Estimated coeficients for the Rand_pop variable (Q.Reg.) 
The  graph shows the  values  of the estimated coefficient  of the Rand_pop variable as a function  of the conditional  distribution  of the 
employment, sales and corporate assets growth rates.  The  bold,  doted  horizontal line is the  OLS estimated coefficient.  The thin,  dashed 
paralel lines represent the confidence intervals  of the fixed-effects estimation.  The  graph  was estimated  using the “grqreg”  package in 
STATA 12 software.  
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a. Employment growth rate 
 
1,154 observations 
b. Sales growth rate 
 
2,076 observations 
c. Tangible assets growth rate 
 
2,076 observations 
Fig. 3 Estimated coeficients for the Neigh_pop variable (Q.Reg.) 
The  graph shows the  values  of the estimated coefficient  of the Neigh_pop variable as a function  of the conditional  distribution  of the 
employment, sales and corporate assets  growth rates.  The  bold,  doted  horizontal line is the  OLS estimated coefficient.  The thin,  dashed 
paralel lines represent the confidence intervals  of the fixed-effects estimation.  The  graph  was estimated  using the “grqreg”  package in 
STATA 12 software.  
 
We may also observe that these results contradict the findings of other valuable studies such as those of 
Ahmed and Cozzarin (2009), Ker et al. (2014) and Macht & Robinson (2009), which point to a positive impact 
of  BAs  on the investee companies.  The  methodological  diference  between these studies and  ours  may  be 
responsible for these opposite conclusions. Indeed,  our empirical analysis is  based  on the financial and 
accounting data of companies operating in diferent industries. Ahmed and Cozzarin (2009) only focus on the 
biotech industry, whereas Ker et al. (2014) made up their own dataset from the Internet and, lastly, Macht & 
Robinson (2009) proceed with nine in-depth telephone interviews. 
The results of our estimations also confirm the role of a firm’s characteristics in determining employment 
growth. When measured by the lagged value of the explained variable in the models explaining employment and 
sales  growth rates, initial size (lnEmpl08, lnSales08 and lnImmC08) presents the  usual  negative sign.  The 
reversion to the mean phenomenon, often mentioned in the literature (see, among many, Evans 1987; Oliveira 
and Fortunato 2006; Fagiolo and Luzzi 2006), is thus confirmed. The variable lnAge does not have the negative 
influence curently mentioned by the literature (see Evans 1987 and Navareti et al. 2014). In most cases, it is 
non-significant and  negative  on the right extreme  of the  distribution  of the employment  growth rate. The 
accounting  variables  depicting the financial independence  of the company (FinIndep) and the capital rotation 
rate approximated by Sales_Ass do not determine the firm growth rate when the industry in which it operates is 
controled for. 
These empirical results lead us to draw several conclusions. Firstly, BAs' support between 2008 and 2009 
had only a slightly positive efect on the employment growth rate of French companies. Secondly, the positive 
efect of BAs' intervention on firms’ growth rate depends essentialy on their economic performance. BAs tend 
significantly to strengthen the  growth rate  of firms which are thriving,  whereas their efect is nul for the 
companies which experienced decreasing employment. Their influence completely vanishes  when firm 
performance is measured by sales and tangible assets growth rate. Finaly, the firm growth process is far from 
being solely explained  by the  presence  of an equity investor  on a board of  directors. On the  whole,  other 
characteristics such as size, age and industry or sector  of activity play a role in  determining economic 
performance. 
6.2 The length of financing relationship does not mater at al  
This Section considers the second hypothesis, according to which, a longer financing relationship enables 
the backed companies to exhibit higher performance. Since the previous estimations have shown that BAs only 
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impact employment growth rate, this Section only considers this performance ratio. Figure 4 presents the value 
of the coeficient of the variable length, measuring the number of years a company has been backed by an angel, 
along the distribution of the firm employment growth rate. 
Employment growth rate  
 
2,107 observations 
Fig. 4 Estimated coeficients for the length variable (Q. Reg.) 
The graph shows the values of the estimated coefficient of the length variable as a function of the conditional distribution of the 
employment, sales and corporate assets  growth rates.  The bold,  doted  horizontal line is the  OLS estimated coefficient.  The thin,  dashed 
paralel lines represent the confidence intervals  of the fixed-effects estimation.  The  graph  was estimated  using the “grqreg”  package in 
STATA 12 software.  
 
When controled for size, age and industry, the length  of the financial relationship between an angel 
investor and an investee does not play any role in determining the employment growth rate. This result is quite 
contradictory with the idea according to which trust is an asset whose accumulation takes time (Dasgupta 1990), 
but also that  during periods  of economic turmoil, in  particular, investors who  have reliable and pertinent 
information at their disposal are more likely to accompany the investee than outsiders hampered by information 
asymmetry.  The advantages  of long-term relationships,  wel-established for  banks (Guo at al.  2013),  have  no 
equivalent  on the informal investors  market. Indeed,  our results  do  not confirm the  positive efect  of a long-
lasting financial relationship, whatever the employment growth rate observed and the estimation technique used. 
Hypothesis 2 is thus rejected. 
This rather deceiving result echoes some previous findings in the literature. One possible explanation may 
consist in the fact that BAs are  not only  oriented towards a financial return  but that their  motivation is  much 
more complex than that of professional investors and encompasses psychological or emotional aspects (Ibrahim 
2008). However, it is somehow contradictory  with research  papers showing the  beter return  on informal 
investments  made  by  business angels than those  made  by  non-angels (Riding  2008), but the control  group is 
radicaly diferent as it is composed of ventures backed by non-professional angels.  
7 Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether angel-backed firms exhibit beter performance than non-backed ones and 
to what extent a longer relationship between an investor and an investee provides an advantage. The results of 
our empirical exercise  only  partialy support  our  prediction that  BAs  provide an advantage to the  venture in 
which they invest. This study contributes to research  on  Business Angels  with three important results. Angel-
backed firms tend to benefit from BAs support when they have higher employment growth rates. This efect is 
 19 
not significant for other firms. Angel-backed firms present higher sales growth rates only on the middle part of 
the distribution, and lastly, angel-backed firms do not invest more than other firms. 
The advantage  BAs provide is  marginal and strictly limited to a smal  part  of the investee companies. 
This  may be explained  by the fact that  BAs are  non-professional investors and that their  past experience as 
entrepreneurs  does  not  help them make appropriate choices. In addition,  we find  no evidence that a longer 
financial relationship grants a beter result. Possibly, angels are not only motivated by helping firms to grow fast 
but are also interested in strictly financial results  or in the  psychological  benefits  of the relationship with an 
entrepreneur. 
The strategy and policy implications of our results are potentialy important.  
For policy-makers, our results imply that institutional BAs do not perform systematicaly beter than other 
investors. This is a serious point to integrate when determining entrepreneurship policies. Indeed, by law, BAs 
benefit from significant tax rebates in order to guide idle savings towards promising ventures. The cost of these 
policies is often considered as over proportionate to their return (Carpentier and Suret 2013, OECD 2011) and 
the risk  of adverse efect is  often  neglected. Indeed, if it is  broadly admited that granting  high  net  worth 
individuals  greater incentives  may increase the  number  of financial investors. But, these investors should 
presumably be providing expertise and contacts in addition to  money. First,  most programs are open to al 
informal investors, without consideration of their capacity to provide advice and guidance to start-ups. Second, 
they are  not focused  on  good  quality  high  growth companies,  which provide  most  of the job creation and 
economic  growth efects. Our results present arguments in favor  of  beter-designed  programs able to select 
sophisticated investors looking for economic performance more than for tax relief. 
Finaly, since our study is one of the first atempts to compare the performance of companies backed by a 
BA with that of a group of similar ones that have not benefited from such support, it naturaly points to research 
issues that need further atention. Among them, we add to the research agenda the inclusion of additional sources 
of finance, like  venture capital  or  public subsidies, and the  need for a more clear-cut identification  of causal 
efect. Another serious chalenge also lies in the lack of data on Business Angels. The existing data represent a 
smal fraction of the market termed the “visible” market. While methods of estimating the invisible market, and, 
therefore, the ful angel  market size, are curently  more art than science, it  has  been  demonstrated through 
various studies  over the  past several  years that total angel investment is likely  greater than  VC investment in 
terms of its total amount. Lastly, as the economic downturn after 2008 could have introduced a significant bias 
















Appendix 1 - Comparison of the business angels markets in Europe 

















Number of BAs 
investing in companies 
through the network 
Average number of 
BAs per investment 
round in 2010 
France 66 4,030 61,1 3,015 75% 2,400 5 
Germany 13 407 31,3 218 54% 60 1,9 
Italy 10 301 30,1 200 66% 126 3 
Netherlands 11 2,375 215,9 1070 45% 109 3 
Spain 13 807 62,1 276 34% 82 1 
Sweden 5 135 27 57 42% 26 1 
UK 22 537 24,4 177 33% 43 3 
Source: National data in the basis EBAN survey, 2010 
 
Appendix 2 - Composition of the three samples 
Data colected for each company combine general descriptive information (activity, size, age, type, legal 
status, etc.), financial data (balance sheet and income statements), and information on the ownership structure. 
This  ownership information alows  us to identify two  populations  within  our diferent samples.  First are 
afiliated companies, operating in private, domestic and foreign business groups, named group. The second are 
the stand-alone companies named stand-alone. 
The third one is a random sample of 1,830 firms. We first selected a population of 465,744 companies 
from FARE data set (FARE, Fichier Approché des Résultats d’Entreprises) of less than 100 employees operating 
in al tradeable sectors except agriculture, forestry and fishing,  mining and quarying, financial and insurance 
activities and real estate activities. Business  Angels investors were not involved in bigger firms  or in these 
specific sectors.  We  generated a random  number associated to each firm Id and chose an  upper limit  value in 
order to  obtain  1,830  observations from the initial firm  population, a size equivalent to  our second  nearest 
neighbor sample. 
To  determine the k–nearest  neighbors sample,  we  use two SAS  macros named «CAHQUAL» and 
«PARTQUAL», developed by Isnard and Sautory (1994)12. Folowing criteria of statistical proximity, the first 
SAS macro alows us to find a beter way to consolidate enterprises with the heuristic “step by step” approach of 
an ascending hierarchical classification (AHC). The SAS macro CAHQUAL produces an ascending hierarchical 
classification on a contingency table using qualitative variables. We defined proxies for industry, size, age and 
location  of companies.  Based  on the initial results, the second  macro PARTQUAL enables us to define and 
separate diferent classes of enterprises. Each enterprise belonging to the nearest neighbor sample is randomly 
selected from the reference population in the same class as its BA-backed equivalent. 
 
Criteria used to set up the partition: 
Industry : The sectoral structure of the three samples is defined on a 30 tradable sectors basis using the 
classification  of  French industries from the  French  National Institute for  Statistics and  Economic  Research 
(INSEE  Rev.  2008), consistent  with the statistical classification  of economic activities in the  European Union 
(NACE  Rev.2)  used  by  Eurostat. 14 aggregated sectors were  used in this study; the  non-tradable sectors: 
agriculture, forestry and fishing,  mining and  quarying, financial and insurance activities, real estate activities 
and public administration and social security are excluded from analysis.  
Location : the breakdown coresponds to the 22 administrative regions of France. 18 regions were used 
in this paper. 
Size is defined with 5 classes: 
No paid employees 
1 to 9 employees 
10 to 19 employees 
20 to 49 employees 
50 to 99 employees 
Age of the enterprise: 
Less than one year 
from 1 to 5 years 
from 5 to 10 years 
 
12 For a detailed description, htp:/www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/outils/analyse_donnees/analyse_donnees_doc.pdf 
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10 years and over 







Appendix 3 - Correlation matrices 
Table 4 – BA and nearest neighbors samples 
 Growth Var_Sales Var_Ass lnEmpl08 lnSales08 lnImmC08 lnAge Gr Neigh_pop FinIndep Sales_Ass 
Growth 1.000           
Var_Sales 0.069* 1.000          
Var_Ass 0.058* 0.579*** 1.000         
lnEmpl08 -0.222*** -0.019 -0.026 1.000        
lnSales08 -0.115*** -0.619*** -0.419*** 0.367*** 1.000       
lnImmC08 -0.087** -0.362*** -0.514*** 0.433*** 0.618*** 1.000      
lnAge -0.078** -0.284*** -0.170*** 0.270*** 0.381*** 0.281*** 1.000     
Gr -0.029 -0.035 -0.090*** 0.305*** 0.177*** 0.254*** 0.148*** 1.000    
Neigh_pop 0.083** -0.012 -0.021 0.026 -0.103*** 0.080*** 0.021 0.022 1.000   
FinIndep -0.010 -0.030 -0.025 -0.019 0.001 0.031 -0.013 -0.034 0.054* 1.000  
Sales_Ass 0.042 -0.014 0.000 -0.081** 0.057** -0.120*** 0.005 0.052* -0.026 -0.004 1.000 
Number of observations = 2,076 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
 
 
Table 5 – BA and random samples 
 Growth Var_Sales Var_Ass lnEmpl08 lnSales08 lnImmC08 lnAge Gr Rand_pop FinIndep Sales_Ass 
Growth 1.000           
Var_Sales 0.073* 1.000          
Var_Ass 0.069 0.314*** 1.000         
lnEmpl08 -0.180*** 0.048 0.030 1.000        
lnSales08 -0.134*** -0.374*** -0.243*** 0.302*** 1.000       
lnImmC08 -0.042 -0.119*** -0.569*** 0.367*** 0.489*** 1.000      
lnAge -0.093** -0.089*** 0.055* 0.121*** 0.140*** 0.027 1.000     
Gr 0.006 0.063** -0.077*** 0.413*** 0.102*** 0.209*** 0.032 1.000    
Rand_pop 0.145*** 0.077*** -0.068** 0.242*** -0.125*** 0.163*** -0.068** 0.277*** 1.000   
FinIndep -0.054 -0.012 0.034 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.008 -0.006 0.056** 1.000  
Sales_Ass -0.013 -0.065** 0.003 0.025 0.065** -0.089*** 0.003 0.057** -0.023 -0.001 1.000 
Number of observations = 2,107 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
 
 
Table 6 – BA sample 
 Growth Var_Sales Var_Ass lnEmpl08 lnSales08 lnImmC08 lnAge Gr Interv FinIndep Sales_Ass 
Growth 1.000           
Var_Sales 0.067** 1.000          
Var_Ass 0.060* 0.421*** 1.000         
lnEmpl08 -0.194*** 0.004 -0.008 1.000        
lnSales08 -0.112*** -0.535*** -0.334*** 0.368*** 1.000       
lnImmC08 -0.069** -0.238*** -0.546*** 0.415*** 0.558*** 1.000      
lnAge -0.077** -0.208*** -0.037* 0.182*** 0.266*** 0.134*** 1.000     
Gr -0.012 0.016 -0.095*** 0.359*** 0.151*** 0.239*** 0.066*** 1.000    
Interv -0.055 -0.085 -0.107 0.162* -0.021 -0.041 0.200*** 0.052 1.000   
FinIndep -0.006 -0.020 0.013 -0.011 0.007 0.018 -0.001 -0.012 -0.055 1.000  
Sales_Ass 0.026 -0.038* 0.000 -0.041 0.061*** -0.103*** 0.004 0.053*** -0.037 -0.002 1.000 
Number of observations = 277 








Appendix 4 - Estimation results 
 
Table 7 Estimation of the employment growth rate for the BA and the nearest neighbors samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* 
lnEmpl08 -0.0271 -0.0463*** -9.82e-07 -0.0594** -0.175*** -0.0939*** 0.778*** 0.721*** 
 (0.0463) (0.00571) (0.00149) (0.0241) (0.0155) (0.0139) (0.0735) (0.0754) 
lnAge 0.106** 6.30e-11 -9.21e-07 -0.0606*** -0.0683** -0.0150 0.111 -0.118 
 (0.0485) (0.00574) (0.000626) (0.0221) (0.0275) (0.0198) (0.123) (0.128) 
Gr 0.0901 8.17e-08 2.95e-07 -0.0173 0.0117 0.0468 -0.142 -0.0346 
 (0.0765) (0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0232) (0.0343) (0.0286) (0.163) (0.166) 
Neigh_pop -0.0543 1.39e-09 0.0426 0.185*** 0.277*** 0.111*** 0.594*** 0.996*** 
 (0.105) (0.0263) (0.0521) (0.0467) (0.0545) (0.0384) (0.210) (0.206) 
FinIndep -1.67e-06 -1.28e-06 -6.57e-07 2.25e-06 -7.50e-07 -6.62e-07 2.30e-05*** 1.03e-05 
 (2.84e-06) (2.31e-06) (2.85e-06) (3.02e-06) (2.91e-06) (1.47e-06) (8.46e-06) (1.24e-05) 
Sales_Ass -2.42e-07 0 1.44e-07 1.56e-07 1.43e-07 7.40e-08 -4.57e-08 1.04e-06*** 
 (2.66e-07) (1.72e-07) (1.16e-07) (1.55e-07) (1.65e-07) (9.56e-08) (1.06e-06) (3.69e-07) 
Manuf -0.118 8.23e-08 -2.60e-06 -0.161*** -0.159** -0.139** -0.215 -0.920** 
 (0.116) (0.0657) (952.4) (0.0614) (0.0649) (0.0587) (0.372) (0.372) 
Building -0.00930 2.98e-08 -4.22e-06 -0.148 -0.211 -0.0919 -0.506 -1.339* 
 (0.157) (0.114) (470.4) (0.183) (0.344) (0.106) (0.705) (0.807) 
Trade&Transp. 0.0268 1.14e-07 -2.05e-06 -0.0871 -0.188*** -0.0742 -0.104 -0.297 
 (0.135) (0.0611) (952.4) (0.0563) (0.0668) (0.0563) (0.379) (0.362) 
Bus. Serv. -0.0626 3.11e-08 -3.06e-06 -0.112** -0.128*** -0.0936** -0.161 -0.603* 
 (0.0817) (0.0599) (952.4) (0.0521) (0.0494) (0.0462) (0.324) (0.311) 
Constant -0.464*** -3.12e-08 3.30e-06 0.498*** 0.985*** 0.281*** -1.211*** -0.515 
 (0.159) (0.0604) (952.4) (0.0882) (0.0798) (0.0593) (0.370) (0.356) 
         
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,261 1,261 
R² 0.0136 0.0369 0.0019 0.0610 0.1463 0.065   
Pseudo R²       0.0804 0.0804 
* Empl. stands for the employment growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
 
Table 8 Estimation of the sales growth rate for the BA and the nearest neighbors samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* 
lnSales08 -0.0601*** -0.0183** -0.246 -0.709*** -0.823*** -0.572*** 0.57*** 0.39*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00785) (0.181) (0.0239) (0.0161) (0.0272) (0.037) (0.037) 
lnAge 0.310*** -0.00881 -0.163 -0.0717 0.00154 -0.179 -0.48** -0.87*** 
 (0.106) (0.0222) (0.417) (0.0764) (0.108) (0.125) (0.188) (0.179) 
Gr 0.0157 0.00977 0.377 0.977*** 0.927*** 0.639*** -0.68** -0.42 
 (0.103) (0.0397) (0.547) (0.101) (0.134) (0.169) (0.339) (0.327) 
Neigh_pop -0.672 -0.0115 0.156 -0.0239 0.0252 -0.285 -0.48 -0.10 
 (0.502) (0.0798) (0.930) (0.122) (0.182) (0.213) (0.388) (0.371) 
FinIndep -1.79e-05 5.81e-08 -3.14e-06 -1.13e-06 -5.37e-06 -1.13e-05 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (3.46e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.11e-05) (9.60e-06) (7.03e-06) (1.15e-05) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales_Ass 3.20e-08 2.01e-08 8.34e-08 1.29e-07 9.98e-08 2.00e-07*** -0.00 0.00 
 (3.19e-07) (1.30e-07) (5.24e-07) (1.45e-07) (1.25e-07) (3.57e-08) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manuf -0.621 -0.107 -0.0999 0.204 0.671* -0.147 0.23 -0.31 
 (1.254) (0.0695) (1.253e+15) (0.191) (0.353) (0.345) (1.053) (1.039) 
Building -0.537 0.0112 0.0532 0.303 0.721 0.695 -1.04 -1.28 
 (0.442) (0.226) (1.253e+15) (0.437) (0.545) (0.510) (1.341) (1.236) 
Trade&Transp. -0.125 0.0173 0.0108 0.466*** 0.843*** 0.331 -0.79 -0.99 
 (0.185) (0.0411) (1.253e+15) (0.157) (0.276) (0.285) (0.950) (0.933) 
Bus. Serv. -0.513*** -0.123*** -0.217 -0.0340 0.363* -0.165 -0.51 -0.98 
 (0.188) (0.0438) (1.253e+15) (0.139) (0.217) (0.240) (0.860) (0.847) 
Constant -0.520** 0.0171 1.771 4.672*** 5.730*** 3.122*** 3.68*** 5.47*** 
 (0.251) (0.0568) (1.253e+15) (0.200) (0.247) (0.289) (0.912) (0.894) 
         
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 
R² 0.0225 0.0097 0.0470 0.3506 0.6346 0.428   
Pseudo R²       0.1562 0.1562 
* Sales stands for the sales growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
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Table 9 Estimation of the tangible assets growth rate for the BA and the nearest neighbors samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Assets * Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* 
lnEmpl08 -0.0599*** -1.94e-05 -3.68e-08 -0.722*** -0.800 -0.452*** 0.38*** 0.11*** 
 (0.0137) (0.496) (0.000537) (0.0682) (0.799) (0.0229) (0.029) (0.016) 
lnAge 0.117 -0 -1.31e-06 0.0661 0.00859 -0.0815 -0.74*** -0.48*** 
 (0.114) (0.800) (0.00748) (0.142) (0.948) (0.133) (0.129) (0.088) 
Gr 0.0478 -0 2.37e-06 0.665*** 0.774 0.360** 0.21 0.44*** 
 (0.0736) (1.653) (0.00440) (0.120) (3.018) (0.158) (0.165) (0.130) 
Neigh_pop 0.142 0.000164 0.154*** 0.227 0.0876 0.690*** 0.05 0.72*** 
 (0.193) (12.61) (0.0401) (0.166) (0.413) (0.180) (0.228) (0.175) 
FinIndep -1.14e-05 -0 -6.54e-07 -1.53e-07 -3.12e-06 -4.44e-06 -0.00 -0.00*** 
 (2.96e-05) (4.92e-05) (7.07e-06) (7.93e-06) (7.66e-06) (9.08e-06) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales_Ass -2.10e-08 0 -0 -6.36e-07 -7.83e-07 -7.52e-07** -0.00 -0.00 
 (8.84e-08) (1.16e-06) (9.29e-09) (1.41e-06) (1.67e-06) (3.41e-07) (0.001) (0.000) 
Manuf -0.0459 0.000170 0.0294 0.160 0.765 0.521 0.22 0.56* 
 (1.087) (0.0442) (0.0254) (0.301) (9.759e+14) (0.389) (0.381) (0.293) 
Building -0.154 -0 -0.0227 -1.000** -1.093 -0.238 -0.29 -1.05** 
 (0.346) (0.189) (0.278) (0.395) (9.759e+14) (0.586) (0.626) (0.494) 
Trade&Transp. -0.0173 -0 -0.0227 -0.127 0.0669 0.278 -0.31 -0.26 
 (0.227) (10.07) (0.0184) (0.349) (9.759e+14) (0.353) (0.366) (0.266) 
Bus. Serv. -0.0590 -0 -0.0227 -0.831*** -0.424 -0.285 -0.16 -0.44** 
 (0.193) (0.199) (0.0169) (0.249) (9.759e+14) (0.300) (0.304) (0.224) 
Constant -0.623** -0.000134 0.0227 3.759*** 4.759 1.253*** 0.02 1.32*** 
 (0.286) (9.628) (0.0252) (0.309) (9.759e+14) (0.349) (0.348) (0.246) 
         
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 
R²      0.291   
Pseudo R² 0.0227 0.0000 0.0020 0.2088 0.5613  0.1335 0.1335 
* Assets stands for the tangible assets growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
 
 
Table 10 Estimation of the employment growth rate for the BA and the random samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* 
         
lnEmpl08 -0.144** -0.102 -9.25e-07 -0.0229 -0.158*** -0.104*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 
 (0.0679) (0.353) (0.00641) (0.0324) (0.0219) (0.0171) (0.104) (0.109) 
lnAge 0.0569 -0 -4.29e-08 -0.101*** -0.115** -0.0398 -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 (0.0762) (0.220) (0.00622) (0.0384) (0.0512) (0.0262) (0.022) (0.025) 
Gr 0.256* 0.0524 1.42e-06 0.0547 0.0787 0.0620 -0.17 0.34 
 (0.149) (1.927) (0.0665) (0.0801) (0.0626) (0.0461) (0.288) (0.282) 
Rand_pop -5.74e-06 0.0594 0.0513 0.192** 0.319*** 0.180*** 0.16 0.74*** 
 (0.128) (1.684) (0.0997) (0.0912) (0.0695) (0.0445) (0.244) (0.244) 
FinIndep 1.90e-06 -2.79e-06 -5.21e-06 -6.98e-06 -8.73e-06 -4.31e-06*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (1.26e-05) (0.000114) (1.07e-05) (0.0379) (1.38e-05) (5.26e-07) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales_Ass -1.00e-06 0 -0 -2.17e-09 -1.27e-08 3.73e-09 0.00 0.00 
 (7.18e-07) (0.000114) (7.50e-08) (1.76e-07) (6.31e-07) (8.65e-08) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manuf -0.251 -0.0594 -1.55e-06 -0.223 -0.138 -0.0872 0.56 0.15 
 (0.303) (1.079e+15) (0.0464) (0.172) (0.151) (0.0934) (0.509) (0.543) 
Building -0.251 -2.97e-07 -2.50e-07 -0.179 -0.0761 -0.0531 0.52 0.18 
 (0.267) (1.079e+15) (0.0363) (0.174) (0.104) (0.0745) (0.415) (0.463) 
Trade&Transp. -0.231 -0.0594 -5.63e-07 -0.200 -0.127 -0.0970 0.60 0.12 
 (0.234) (1.079e+15) (0.0365) (0.154) (0.0826) (0.0706) (0.389) (0.435) 
Bus. Serv. 0.0626 -2.97e-07 -2.44e-07 -0.130 -0.0974 -0.0201 0.38 0.27 
 (0.230) (1.079e+15) (0.0365) (0.168) (0.0891) (0.0681) (0.379) (0.415) 
Constant -0.382 2.97e-07 1.67e-06 0.489** 0.947*** 0.214*** -0.90** -1.04** 
 (0.275) (1.079e+15) (0.0384) (0.204) (0.125) (0.0825) (0.395) (0.421) 
         
Observations 806 806 806 806 806 806 913 913 
R²      0.084   
Pseudo R² 0.0381 0.0600 0.0032 0.0634 0.1292  0.1008 0.1008 
* Empl. stands for the employment growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
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Table 11 Estimation of the sales growth rate for the BA and the random samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* Sales* 
         
lnSales08 -0.0446*** -0.0224*** -0.00388 -0.176 -0.637*** -0.332*** 0.67*** 0.58*** 
 (0.00829) (0.00273) (0.00315) (1.614) (0.0488) (0.0333) (0.055) (0.056) 
lnAge 0.200** -0 -0.0270** -0.224 -0.0786 -0.103 -0.07 -0.52* 
 (0.0782) (0.00828) (0.0121) (1.344) (0.0902) (0.0915) (0.269) (0.270) 
Gr -0.0822 -0.0149 -0.0120 0.355 1.543*** 0.824*** -0.18 0.12 
 (0.211) (0.0482) (0.0315) (7.131) (0.251) (0.251) (0.588) (0.581) 
Rand_pop -0.511 0.0105 0.154** 0.622*** 0.938*** 0.530** 0.73 1.34*** 
 (0.510) (0.0593) (0.0710) (0.121) (0.220) (0.214) (0.457) (0.451) 
FinIndep 3.81e-06 1.00e-07 -9.66e-07 -3.58e-06 6.73e-07 -2.33e-06 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (7.09e-06) (3.48e-06) (2.48e-06) (1.94e-05) (8.77e-06) (2.23e-06) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales_Ass -6.66e-07 -3.21e-07 -3.35e-07** -3.29e-07 -9.13e-08 -2.88e-07*** -0.00*** -0.00* 
 (5.91e-07) (3.19e-07) (1.57e-07) (4.81e-05) (2.46e-07) (3.45e-08) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manuf -3.213 -0.241 -0.0108 0.206 0.916* -0.412 -0.76 -0.82 
 (2.310) (0.164) (0.0397) (1.049e+15) (0.527) (0.429) (0.736) (0.726) 
Building -0.0738 -0.0456 0.0221 0.312 1.017*** 0.604*** -0.72 -0.42 
 (0.0973) (0.0368) (0.0217) (1.049e+15) (0.201) (0.183) (0.757) (0.756) 
Trade&Transp. -0.0245 0 0.00454 0.238 1.025*** 0.400*** -0.57 -0.94 
 (0.109) (0.0216) (0.0117) (1.049e+15) (0.204) (0.151) (0.632) (0.636) 
Bus. Serv. -0.423*** -0.159*** -0.0119 0.227 0.719*** 0.194 -0.58 -0.59 
 (0.143) (0.0254) (0.0137) (1.049e+15) (0.167) (0.149) (0.549) (0.551) 
Constant -0.555*** 0.00449 0.0499 1.289 3.615*** 1.102*** 3.38*** 4.26*** 
 (0.192) (0.0140) (0.0325) (1.049e+15) (0.269) (0.203) (0.731) (0.728) 
         
Observations 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 
R²      0.181   
Pseudo-R² 0.0391 0.0200 0.0200 0.0761 0.3427  0.1626 0.1626 
* Sales stands for the sales growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
 
 
Table 12 Estimation of the tangible assets growth rate for the BA and the random samples 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Assets* Assets* Assets* Assets* Assets* Assets* Assets* Assets* 
         
lnImmC08 -0.0795*** -3.46e-07 0 -0.855*** -0.839*** -0.526*** 0.39*** 0.04*** 
 (0.0189) (111.6) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0138) (0.0200) (0.040) (0.015) 
lnAge 0.211 -0 0 0.198* -0 0.423*** -0.47*** -0.18** 
 (0.162) (202.7) (0.00657) (0.105) (0.0475) (0.126) (0.125) (0.076) 
Gr -0.00280 4.26e-07 -0 1.235 1.262 0.463** -0.10 0.37* 
 (0.151) (2.751) (0.0249) (2.398) (2.310) (0.224) (0.263) (0.206) 
Rand_pop 0.295 2.91e-06 0.154*** 0.462 0.404 1.148*** 0.25 1.15*** 
 (0.242) (9.021e+14) (0.0491) (2.407) (2.164) (0.182) (0.242) (0.187) 
FinIndep 4.32e-06 0 -0 -2.64e-06 -3.94e-06 1.26e-05* -0.00 -0.00*** 
 (1.39e-05) (0.0679) (1.30e-05) (2.32e-05) (1.97e-05) (7.51e-06) (0.001) (0.000) 
Sales_Ass -2.97e-08 0 0 -5.74e-07 -6.00e-07 -5.23e-07** -0.00 -0.00 
 (1.89e-07) (0.0613) (2.02e-07) (1.42e-06) (3.24e-06) (2.16e-07) (0.002) (0.000) 
Manuf -0.0327 2.48e-06 -0.0391 -0.0401 0.249 -0.180 -0.52 -0.32 
 (1.381) (460.6) (0.0711) (0.328) (0.384) (0.442) (0.433) (0.286) 
Building 0.187 -4.26e-07 -0.0404 -0.606*** -0.657** -0.236 -0.28 -0.43** 
 (0.220) (9.021e+14) (0.0701) (0.196) (0.323) (0.316) (0.339) (0.208) 
Trade&Transp. 0.115 -0 -0.0380 0.341** -0 0.617** 0.33 0.08 
 (0.142) (9.021e+14) (0.0664) (0.147) (0.170) (0.308) (0.319) (0.176) 
Bus. Serv. 0.000441 0 -0.0404 -1.051*** -0.615*** -1.079*** -0.13 -0.71*** 
 (0.0347) (927.4) (0.0857) (0.199) (0.159) (0.287) (0.302) (0.161) 
Constant -1.074** -2.39e-06 0.0404 3.616*** 4.561*** 0.700** -0.61* 0.81*** 
 (0.467) (9.021e+14) (0.103) (0.162) (0.365) (0.345) (0.367) (0.198) 
         
Observations 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 
R²      0.378   
Pseudo-R² 0.0320 0.0000 0.0013 0.4122 0.5899  0.1305 0.1305 
* Assets stands for the tangible assets growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
The stars indicate the degree of significance (*for 10%, **for 5% and ***for 1%). 
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Table 13 Estimation of the employment growth rate according to the length of the financial relationship 
 Quantile regression OLS Logit model 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  Decrease Increase 
Variables Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* Empl.* 
         
lnEmpl08 -0.0287 -0.0436 -0.0190 -0.134** -0.232** -0.135*** 0,7202 ***  0,6696731*** 
 (0.251) (0.0318) (4.249) (0.0622) (0.0945) (0.0456) (0,229) 0,232 
lnAge -0.161 -0.00771 -0.0602 -0.00602 -0.125 -0.0532 -0,0236 -0,0444 
 (0.315) (0.0811) (1.060) (0.162) (1.886) (0.0617) (0,041) 0,042 
Gr 0.0474 -0.00251 0.0877 0.00881 0.152 0.0891 0,0366 0,5220 
 (0.186) (0.0854) (5.666) (0.117) (0.189) (0.0762) (0,497) 0,473 
length -0.0147 -0.0251 0.0159 -0.0221 -0.0327 -0.0234 0,2384* 0,1245 
 (0.131) (0.0308) (2.599) (0.0331) (0.0455) (0.0234) (0,126) 0,125 
FinIndep -3.61e-06 -4.08e-06 -5.43e-06 -7.49e-06 -8.42e-06 -5.03e-06*** 0,0030 0,0011 
 (0.158) (0.110) (0.0959) (0.116) (0.126) (7.71e-07) (0,096) 0,018 
Sales_Ass 6.27e-07 8.82e-08 -1.66e-07 -8.61e-07 -1.58e-06 -4.24e-07** 0,0000 -0,0001* 
 (0.179) (0.000255) (0.604) (0.000452) (0.00377) (1.90e-07) (0,020) 0,000 
Manuf 0.448 0.109 0.103 -0.197 -0.186 0.0160 0,8446 0,5881 
 (2.819e+14) (3.077e+12) (1.951e+15) (0.273) (4.493e+14) (0.186) (1,067) 1,088 
Building 0.554 0.101 0.0162 -0.364 -0.412 -0.150 -0,4693 -1,1022*** 
 (2.819e+14) (3.077e+12) (2.141e+14) (0.337) (4.493e+14) (0.238) (1,230) 1,150 
Trade&Transp. 0.525 0.121 0.179 -0.134 -0.145 0.0227 0,5099 0,4310 
 (2.819e+14) (3.077e+12) (1.951e+15) (0.245) (4.493e+14) (0.167) (1,052) 1,047 
Bus. Serv. 0.400 0.110 0.141 -0.230 -0.128 -0.000145 0,5076 0,5048 
 (2.819e+14) (3.077e+12) (1.951e+15) (0.219) (4.493e+14) (0.147) (0,894) 0,930 
Constant -0.413 -0.0455 -0.00631 0.950*** 1.527 0.500** -10,6450 -0,9042 
 (2.819e+14) (3.077e+12) (1.951e+15) (0.288) (4.493e+14) (0.197) (0,979) 1,030 
         
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 229 229 
R²      0.107   
Pseudo-R² 0.0667 0.0494 0.0241 0.0847 0.1503  0.0839 0.0839 
* Empl. stands for the employment growth rate 
Standard errors estimated by the Bootstrap methodology are in parentheses (number of Bootstrap samples = 500). 
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